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Abstract
Despite their tremendous success in modelling high-
dimensional data manifolds, deep neural networks suffer
from the threat of adversarial attacks - Existence of perceptu-
ally valid input-like samples obtained through careful pertur-
bation that lead to degradation in the performance of the un-
derlying model. Major concerns with existing defense mech-
anisms include non-generalizability across different attacks,
models and large inference time. In this paper, we propose
a generalized defense mechanism capitalizing on the expres-
sive power of regularized latent space based generative mod-
els. We design an adversarial filter, devoid of access to classi-
fier and adversaries, which makes it usable in tandem with
any classifier. The basic idea is to learn a Lipschitz con-
strained mapping from the data manifold, incorporating ad-
versarial perturbations, to a quantized latent space and re-map
it to the true data manifold. Specifically, we simultaneously
auto-encode the data manifold and its perturbations implic-
itly through the perturbations of the regularized and quantized
generative latent space, realized using variational inference.
We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed formulation in
providing resilience against multiple attack types (black and
white box) and methods, while being almost real-time. Our
experiments show that the proposed method surpasses the
state-of-the-art techniques in several cases.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown tremendous success in
various computer vision tasks. One of the primary factors
contributing to their success is the availability of abundant
data. This generally leads to an incomplete exploration of
data space with the available training set, which in-turn re-
sults in loopholes in the data manifold (Gilmer et al. 2018;
Schmidt et al. 2018). Adversarial attacks exploit these gaps
in the data manifold, unexplored by the classifier which
leads to the failure of otherwise successful networks. This
unexplored subspace, called adversarial subspace, contains
adversarial samples generated using perturbation of origi-
nal training samples with carefully designed synthetic noise
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014a; Szegedy et al.
2013; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Carlini
and Wagner 2017; Madry et al. 2017). This is an important
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concern not only from a point of security but also from a
generalization perspective (Tsipras et al. 2018). In the rest
of the section, we will present an overview of the existing
adversarial attacks, defense mechanisms along with the mo-
tivation for our work.
Adversarial attacks - General principles
An adversarial sample is obtained by perturbing the input
sample with a small amount such that its perceptual quality
is unaltered but the class label is changed under the classifier.
Formally, let x ∈ RN denote a sample from the natural data
manifold and x′ = x+δ, denote a perturbation on xwith δ ∈
S, S ⊆ RN being the space of all possible perturbations.
Under a given distance metricD and a classification scheme
h(x), the sample x′ is called an adversarial example for x
if D(x,x′) ≤  and h(x) 6= h(x′). A large body of attacks
consider a lp-norm basedD, with l2 and l∞ norms being the
significant ones, and solve an optimization problem on the
loss function of h(x) to obtain the desired δ. Attacks can be
targeted so that the classifier is misguided to a specific class
or non-targeted so that it outputs an arbitrary class different
from the original class. Further categorization of adversarial
attacks is based on the level of access the attacker has about
the classification and defense scheme. Specifically they are
defined as white and black box attacks.
Attack methods
There is a gamut of literature on creating adversarial at-
tacks. Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy propose Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) that performs a one step gra-
dient update along the direction of sign of gradient of loss
at each pixel. Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio introduced
Basic Iterative method (BIM) which runs FGSM for a few it-
erations. Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016) is another iterative attack which computes adversar-
ial perturbations through an orthogonal projection of the
sample on the decision boundary. Carlini-Wagner (CW) at-
tack (Carlini and Wagner 2017) is an optimization based at-
tack that uses logits-based objective function instead of the
commonly used cross-entropy loss. We choose these attacks
since they cover a good breadth of the class of attacks.
Prior art on defense mechanisms
A large number of defense mechanisms to diminish the ef-
fect of adversarial attacks are available (Goodfellow et al.
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2016; Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018; Ilyas et
al. 2017; Song et al. 2017; Shen et al. 2017; Meng and Chen
2017; Madry et al. 2017; Papernot et al. 2016b). Broadly,
these can be divided into the following categories -
1. Adversarial retraining - A natural way to make the clas-
sifier robust against the adversaries is to retrain the clas-
sifier using adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al. 2016;
Szegedy et al. 2013). Several improvisations of adver-
sarial retraining have been proposed (Madry et al. 2017;
Sinha, Namkoong, and Duchi 2017; Trame`r et al. 2017).
While adversarial retraining is a simple method for de-
fense and is robust to first-order adversaries, it is shown to
be ineffective towards DeepFool and CW attack (Trame`r
et al. 2017) and also black-box attacks (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014b; Sharma and Chen 2017;
Ding et al. 2019)
2. Modified training - Here the idea is to tweak the training
procedure and/or the training examples of the classifier so
that the decision boundary learnt is robust to adversarial
examples (Papernot et al. 2016b; Guo et al. 2017; Xiao et
al. 2018; Dhillon et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2017). However,
Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner demonstrate that most of
these defenses are vulnerable because they capitalize on
obfuscated gradients that can be mitigated.
3. Adversarial filtering - These defense mechanisms pre-
process the adversarial examples to make them non-
adversarial either by manifold projection or by using gen-
erative models. For example, MagNet (Meng and Chen
2017) trains a collection of detector networks that differ-
entiate between normal and adversarial examples. It also
includes a reformer network (one or a collection of auto-
encoders) to push adversarial examples close to the data
manifold. A recent strategy called Defense-GAN (Saman-
gouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018) trains a generative
adversarial network (GAN) (Goodfellow et al. 2014) only
on legitimate examples and uses it to denoise adversarial
examples. At the time of inference, they find images from
the range of generator that are near the input image but lie
on the legitimate data manifold. This requires L iterations
of back propagation for R random initializations to find
the nearest legitimate image, typical value of L is 200 and
R is 10. Other GAN based defences, for example, Pix-
elDefend (Song et al. 2017) and APE-GAN (Shen et al.
2017), perform image-to-image translation to convert an
adversarial image into a legitimate image.
Problem setting and our contributions
As mentioned, while the existing defense mechanisms have
their own merits, each of them suffer from aforementioned
disadvantages. Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner argue that most
of these methods give a false sense of security since most of
them capitalize on masking the gradients (obfuscated gradi-
ents) so that it is difficult to generate adversarial examples.
However, they show that this can be circumvented using
techniques such as approximation of derivatives by a differ-
entiable approximation of the function, reparameterization
and computation of expectations. In this paper, we propose a
defense mechanism based on quantized latent variable gen-
erative autoencoders to alleviate the aforementioned issues.
Our contributions are enlisted below:
1. Propose a quantized latent variable generative model
based defense mechanism devoid of access to classifier
and adversaries.
2. Construction of a Lipschitz constrained latent encoder
that preserves the distances under a metric space on the
latent and the data manifolds.
3. Constraining the latent space to follow a known distribu-
tion so that stochastic exploration of the latent neighbour-
hood corresponding to the data neighbourhood is possi-
ble.
4. Use of dual decoders with a quantization on the latent
space so that a large neighbourhood around a data sample
is explored and easily remapped back to the data point.
Proposed Method
Motivation
In many previous works it is hypothesized that the adver-
sarial examples fall off the data manifold (Lee, Han, and
Lee 2017; Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018). This
suggests that a defense model could potentially be built by
replacing an adversarial example with the nearest correctly-
classified sample from the data manifold. However, search-
ing in high-dimensional data manifolds is expensive, not
generalizable and moreover, it has been found that the adver-
sarial examples might fall on the data manifold too (Gilmer
et al. 2018). Thus, a better approach could be to project the
data manifold onto an explorable compact generative latent
space and remap the latent codes back to the legitimate data.
If the latent space projector is made to be Lipschitz con-
strained and compact, then one can hope that the adversarial
examples adhere to a latent code that is invertible to the le-
gitimate data.
Lipschitz constrained latent transformation
Let f(x) : RN → RM be a Lipschitz constrained function
which maps a data point x of dimension N to a latent vector
z of dimension M such that M < N . For such an f , if the
adversarial perturbation δ on x is bounded then the equiva-
lent perturbation δz on z is also bounded.
Since the goal is to learn mappings in high-dimensional
spaces, we use Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) parameter-
ized by θ, to approximate fθ. There have been many meth-
ods proposed to make a DNN K-Lipschitz including gra-
dient clipping (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) and
gradient norm penalty (Gulrajani et al. 2017). We employ
gradient norm penalty on the encoder since it is observed to
be more stable.
Latent exploration via variational inference
As mentioned earlier, the goal is to explore the latent neigh-
bourhood induced by perturbing a given input sample. This
effectively means that one has to sample from the true con-
ditional distribution p(zˆ|x). However since there is no direct
Figure 1: Proposed LQ-VAE - A Lipschitz constrained encoder (Lf ) encodes the input image into a latent space quantized by
the function H which is explored through a stochastic perturbation (). During inference, Decoder1 maps the quantized latent
codes generated by the adversarial images back to the image space. Training is done only on real data samples by using an
approximate differentiable version of Decoder1 (i.e. Decoder2).
access to p(zˆ|x) we propose to use the principles of vari-
ational inference (Kingma and Welling 2013), where sam-
pling from p(zˆ|x) is facilitated by approximating it with a
variational distribution qθ(zˆ|x) on zˆ that is parameterized by
the encoder network fθ. Now minimizing the KL-divergence
between p(zˆ|x) and qθ(zˆ|x) results in the maximization of
the so-called evidence lower bound given as follows:
L = Eqθ(zˆ|x)[log pφ(x|zˆ)]− DKL [qθ(zˆ|x)||pθ(zˆ)] (1)
where pφ(x|zˆ) represents a probabilistic decoder network
that maps the latent space back to the data space and pθ(zˆ)
is an arbitrary prior on zˆ which is usually a Normal distribu-
tion. We propose to sample zˆ from qθ(zˆ|x) using the encoder
network fθ through the reparameterization trick (Kingma
and Welling 2013). Thus, given a true data example, a cloud
of perturbations is created around its latent representation
obtained through Lipschitz constrained encoder fθ, via vari-
ational sampling. The probabilistic decoder pφ(x|zˆ), param-
eterized using a neural network gφ, is then tasked to map
all the points within that cloud to a single input example
through maximization of the likelihood term in (1), as shown
in Figure 1. Mathematically, if the encoder embeds and x to
a zˆ and x + δ to a zˆ′, such that ||zˆ − zˆ′|| ≤ |δz| then de-
coder learns gφ(zˆ) = gφ(zˆ′) = x. During inference, when
the encoder is presented with an adversarial example, it will
place it within the learned latent cloud so that the decoder
converts it into a non-adversarial sample. This fact has been
illustrated in Figure 2 where a 2D t-SNE plot of the latent
encodings (from the Lipschitz constrained encoder) of the
true and the CW l2 attacked adversarial samples from the
MNIST data is shown. It can be seen that embeddings of the
adversaries are extremely close to those of the true samples.
Figure 2: t-SNE plot of the latent encodings of mnist real
images and CW adversarial images. It can seen that the em-
beddings of real and adversarial data overlap.
Latent space quantization
A recent work by Gilmer et al. makes a very important ob-
servation - closeness from a correctly classified sample does
not guarantee non-adversarial nature. In other words, since
the latent space is real-valued it is impossible to explore it
in its entirety. Thus, there is a high chance that a probabilis-
tic decoder gφ is unable to remove the adversarial noise even
when the latent vector for an adversarial example falls within
the seen latent cloud. We propose to address this issue by
quantizing the latent space before it is input to the decoder.
Specifically, we design a fixed discrete quantization func-
tion H applied on each dimension of the real-output of the
encoder as follows:
zi = Hi(zˆ) =
{
+1 if |zˆi| ≤ η
−1 otherwise (2)
where η is the quantization threshold. H(.) thus converts zˆ
into binary coded vectors z thereby ensuring that the decoder
gφ receives a single latent code for all the input samples that
map within a small neighbourhood of zˆ. In contrast to real
zˆ, where gφ has to learn a non-injective mapping, quantiza-
tion allows it to learn a mapping close to injective since the
same code vector is produced for all zˆ in this neighbourhood,
hence making the training easier. This procedure potentially
increases the robustness of the model too since the goal of
an adversarial resilience model is not to exactly reproduce
the non-adversarial version of a given sample but to produce
an approximate version that is non-adversarial. Thus, it is
imperative to just look for the presence or absence of the
salient features that preserve the identity of a given exam-
ple, which is accomplished by the binary quantization with
the threshold η being a hyperparameter whose value is cho-
sen as, however not limited to, 0.67449 since it gives equal
probability to a bit being +1 or -1. Thus, any deviation in the
input sample falling outside the latent cloud leads to flipping
of the bits in the quantized space.
Theorem 1 Let zˆ and zˆadv be the latent encoding of x and
xadv respectively. Let z = H(zˆ) and zadv = H(zˆadv) be
the corresponding quantizations. Then the probability of a
particular bit being flipped is given by
p =
∫ η+|δz|
η−|δz|
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ (3)
and the probability of k = 6 (≈ 10%) bit flips for M = 64
dimensional latent space is
(
M
k
)
pk(1 − p)M−k = 1.177 ×
10−3 which is significantly low, when η = 0.67449 is cho-
sen such that both bits are equally likely, |δz| = K|δ| =
0.1×0.3 = 0.03 and pzˆ(zˆ) = N (0, 1) (proof in supplemen-
tary material).
Figure 3 depicts the bit-flippings in the latent codes of the
CW adversaries on the MNIST data - It can be seen that
about 90 % of the total adversaries undergo less than 6%
of bits being flipped resulting in high classification accu-
racy, confirming the effectiveness of the decoder in ignoring
the bit-flippings. Further, the binary encoding layer ensures
that gradient produced at that layer is either 0 or undefined,
thereby making a gradient based attack on the defense mech-
anism impossible.
Adversarial resilience by LQ-VAE
As mentioned above, quantization prevents the flow of gra-
dients through the encoder network fθ that makes it non-
trainable along with the decoder gφ. We, therefore, create a
copy of gφ, say hψ , which uses soft quantization in place
of H (called H˜) and enable the training of fθ. A com-
plete overview of the proposed method, called as Lisphitz-
constrained quantized variational auto-encoder (LQ-VAE) is
shown in Figure 1. Algorithm 1 gives the details of the LQ-
VAE training procedure where the likelihood term in (1) is
Figure 3: Effect of binary quantization on adversaries - It can
be seen that more than 90 % of the adversaries have less than
6% of the bit flippings with high classification accuracy.
Algorithm 1 LQ-VAE algorithm
Input: Dataset D, Batchsize B, Encoder fθ, Decoder1
gφ, Learning rate η, Quantization functions H , H˜
Output Parameters θ∗, φ∗
1: Make a copy hψ of decoder gφ
2: repeat
3: Sample {x(1) · · ·x(B)} from dataset D
4: µ(i)z , σ
(i)
z ← fθ(x(i))
5: Sample zˆ(i) from N (µ(i)z ,σ(i)z
2
)
6: xˆ(i)1 ← hψ(H˜(zˆ(i)))
7: xˆ(i)2 ← gφ(H(zˆ(i)))
8: Lh ←
∑B
i=1
∥∥∥x(i) − xˆ(i)1 ∥∥∥2
2
9: Lg ←
∑B
i=1
∥∥∥x(i) − xˆ(i)2 ∥∥∥2
2
10: Lf ← Lh+
∑B
i=1DKL
[
N (µ(i)z , σ(i)z
2
)||N (0, 1)
]
+∑B
i=1
[∥∥∇xfθ(x(i))∥∥2 −K]2
11: θ ← θ + η∇θLf
12: φ← φ+ η∇φLg
13: ψ ← ψ + η∇ψLh
14: until convergence of θ, φ
approximated using mean-squared error term between the
input and the output. Note that the network hψ is only used
for training, not for inference. The defense scheme only con-
tains the pipeline of fθ −H − gφ.
Experiments and results
We consider MNIST (LeCun, Cortes, and Burges 2010),
FMNIST1, and CelebA (Liu et al. 2015) datasets and use
three classifier architectures, named A, B, and C, for black
box and white box experiments2. For MNIST and FM-
NIST, the standard 10 class classification task is consid-
1https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
2Architectures of all the classifiers and LQ-VAE is included in
supplementary material.
ered, whereas for CelebA, a binary classification task of
gender classification is taken, with accuracy as the metric.
Five attack types namely, FGSM with  = 0.3 (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014a), l2 CW (Carlini and Wagner
2017), Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard
2016), iterative FGSM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
2016) and Madry (Madry et al. 2017), generated from clev-
erhans library (Papernot et al. 2016a), are considered for
experimentation as they cover a good breadth of attack
types. We compare our results with three defense strate-
gies - Defense GAN (Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa
2018), Madry (Madry et al. 2017) and Adversarial retraining
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014a) based on the fol-
lowing facts (i) Defense GAN is close to our work in spirit.
Their method also employs a generative model (GAN) and
does not train on adversarial examples, (ii) Madry retrain-
ing is claimed to be a robust defense against all first-order
gradient computation based attacks and (iii) adversarial re-
training is one of the earliest benchmark defenses created.
We use the Adam optimizer (β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.99) with a
learning rate of 10−3 to train LQ-VAE. We study different
attack types, namely black box attacks, white box attack on
classifier and end-to-end white box attack.
1. Black box attacks - The attacker neither has access to the
original classifier nor the defense scheme, rather he has
to generate adversarial examples on a substitute classifier
(Papernot et al. 2017).
2. White box attacks - We subdivide white box attacks into
two further categories:
(a) White box attacks on classifier - In this case, it is as-
sumed that the attacker has access to the original classi-
fier but not the defense scheme and the adversarial ex-
amples are generated by computing gradients over the
original classifier.
(b) White box attacks with BPDA - The attacker has
access to both the original classifier and the defense
mechanism. In other words, the adversarial examples
can be generated by computing gradients over the LQ-
VAE - classifier combination. Athalye, Carlini, and
Wagner argue that such methods can be attacked using
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA).
We attack the defense mechanism by approximating the
discretization function H(zˆ) with H˜(zˆ) given as fol-
lows:
H˜i(zˆ) =
η2 − zˆ2i
c+ |η2 − zˆ2i |
(4)
where c is a non-negative hyperparameter. It can be
seen that H(zˆ) = H˜(zˆ) when c = 0.
Results on white box attacks on classifier
For MNIST and FMNIST, we use 60,000 real images for
training the defense mechanisms and 10,000 adversarial im-
ages on the standard test set for testing. For CelebA, we use
90% images for training and remaining for testing. Classifi-
cation accuracy of all three classifier models, A, B, and C,
in presence and absence of defense mechanisms are listed in
Table 1, 2, and 3 for MNIST, FMNIST, and CelebA, respec-
tively. The attacks reduce classification accuracy of all the
models drastically. Adversarial retraining is able to defend
FGSM attack up to a certain extent but fails on the other
attacks, since the retraining is performed using adversar-
ial examples generated by FGSM attacks. Similarly Madry,
which also uses first order gradients based adversarial im-
ages to retrain the classifiers, shows consistent performance
against FGSM. However, for Deepfool and CW attack, its
performance is lower than Defense-GAN and the proposed
LQ-VAE. Both, Defense-GAN and LQ-VAE, do not require
adversarial augmentation, however, we note that LQ-VAE
consistently outperforms Defense-GAN.
Results on white box attacks with BPDA
Most of the defense mechanisms that rely on gradient obfus-
cation (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) are broken com-
pletely by attacking using BPDA. However, Defense-GAN
still has 55% accuracy on MNIST after the attack since it
does not rely on gradient obfuscation. Our work is similar in
spirit to Defense-GAN in thse sense that it also does not rely
on gradient obfuscation. We generate adversarial examples
for the LQ-VAE - classifier combination via BPDA, how-
ever, passing these examples to the Lipschitz constrained
encoder still results in these adversarial examples getting
the same discrete latent codes (refer Figure 3 and Theo-
rem 1) as their non-adversarial counterparts and thus their
non-adversarial counterparts are successfully reconstructed
by the decoder resulting in their correct classification (refer
Table 7). We compare our results with Defense-GAN since
Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner show that it can also be at-
tacked using BPDA.
Results on black box attacks
For black box experiments, we consider one attack each
on a dataset as a representative set. Specifically, FGSM for
MNIST, Deepfool for FMINST and CW for CelebA are con-
sidered with six-pairs of classifiers used for attacking and
substitute. A similar trend is observed with the black box at-
tacks as well, as seen in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Madry retraining
performs the best on the FGSM attack because it is trained
on a superset of first-order methods of which FGSM is a sub-
set. However, the performance of LQ-VAE is consistent irre-
spective of the classifier pairs across all cases and is closely
comparable (or better) to the best case. On Deepfool and
CW, LQ-VAE outperforms the others in most of the cases.
We hypothesize that this behaviour of LQ-VAE comes from
the Lipschitz constraining, by which it becomes a strong de-
fense when the attack alters fewer pixels of the input image
yet changing the class, as in the case of CW and Deepfool,
unlike in FGSM. In summary, the proposed method is in-
variant to white or black box attack types.
Discussions and Conclusions
LQ-VAE and Defense-GAN fall into the same category of
defense mechanisms in the sense that they both capitalize
on the expressive capacity of generative models. Further,
Attack Model No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
FGSM A 92.76 11.50 77.00 69.75 78.87 53.72
B 91.17 10.14 69.41 56.72 76.94 59.79
C 89.06 11.60 67.07 56.34 64.16 66.43
Deepfool A 92.76 5.29 79.30 77.48 57.17 6.52
B 91.17 6.54 79.41 74.97 52.58 14.74
C 89.06 7.65 79.89 74.82 39.93 24.71
CW A 92.76 5.41 80.64 78.75 62.55 5.35
B 91.17 6.61 81.58 78.18 56.48 6.35
C 89.06 7.89 82.31 78.58 43.72 8.00
Average 91.00 8.07 77.40 71.73 59.15 27.29
Table 1: Classification accuracy of the FMNIST classifiers on white box attacks with various defense strategies
Attack Model No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
FGSM A 99.40 20.16 89.17 90.43 96.85 67.95
B 99.41 13.17 86.70 88.52 96.20 49.49
C 98.37 5.66 83.02 86.7 84.71 80.75
Deepfool A 99.40 7.38 97.60 95.41 67.82 3.10
B 99.41 5.88 97.74 93.03 66.35 5.75
C 98.37 48.24 97.42 92.32 62.38 10.97
CW A 99.40 8.85 97.66 94.37 69.15 1.20
B 99.41 5.07 97.20 90.56 71.35 1.45
C 98.37 8.44 97.36 92.5 58.65 2.15
Average 99.06 13.65 93.76 91.54 74.83 24.76
Table 2: Classification accuracy of the MNIST classifiers on white box attacks with various defense strategies.
Attack Model No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
FGSM A 96.34 3.65 81.04 74.13 62.35 4.53
B 96.60 3.40 64.74 67.06 71.42 72.88
C 95.02 28.62 61.48 53.76 61.35 42.55
Deepfool A 96.34 3.56 85.89 83.87 52.86 6.26
B 96.60 2.43 83.81 83.65 49.39 14.17
C 95.02 10.92 62.79 78.56 42.37 38.45
CW A 96.34 6.98 85.90 84.64 58.62 11.88
B 96.60 6.88 86.29 86.01 60.33 12.91
C 95.02 10.92 79.20 78.56 45.02 38.45
Iter FGSM A 96.34 3.12 85.44 81.00 82.34 3.50
B 96.60 3.55 72.29 72.05 72.19 9.16
C 95.02 11.92 52.12 42.13 90.87 19.47
Madry A 96.34 2.84 85.11 81.43 76.35 3.52
B 96.60 3.12 70.01 74.01 70.32 8.52
C 95.02 8.57 54.00 45.11 84.09 18.59
Average 95.99 7.37 74.01 72.40 65.32 20.32
Table 3: Classification accuracy of the CelebA classifiers on white box attacks with various defense strategies.
both of the models generalize better on the adaptive or un-
seen attacks (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) since both
of them neither need access to the classifier nor train on a
certain type of adversaries. However, LQ-VAE offers sev-
eral advantages over Defense-GAN such as - (i) LQ-VAE
does not involve a run-time search on the latent space unlike
Defense-GAN which makes it orders of magnitude faster
and independent of latent search parameters. Rather in LQ-
VAE, the search in the latent space is implicitly done by
effective encoding, quantization and decoding of the latent
space. (ii) training a VAE is known to be easier and faster,
yielding a better data likelihood than a GAN which is known
to be difficult to be trained, especially on color datasets such
as CelebA, (iii) LQ-VAE has a latent encoding followed by
the re-mapping of the latent space to the data space which
makes it invariant to attack types while Defense-GAN is
Classifier No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
Substitute
A/B 99.40 33.32 88.09 89.14 97.17 95.78
A/C 99.40 45.35 90.60 90.08 98.27 96.82
B/A 99.41 42.22 90.63 91.40 97.38 94.64
B/C 99.41 38.73 89.92 89.89 98.03 95.30
C/A 98.37 28.93 91.98 90.90 90.59 32.12
C/B 98.37 18.01 89.38 88.73 89.14 21.79
Average 99.06 34.43 90.10 90.02 95.10 72.74
Table 4: Classification accuracy of the MNIST classifier on FGSM black box attack images generated using substitute model.
Classifier/ No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
Substitute
A/B 92.76 29.14 77.74 74.41 60.11 48.27
A/C 92.76 35.44 77.11 74.11 62.58 57.53
B/A 91.17 67.82 81.33 77.97 80.71 76.61
B/C 91.17 45.55 78.83 74.5 69.19 64.05
C/A 89.06 79.11 82.12 78.82 80.99 81.84
C/B 89.06 47.26 80.76 76.6 67.46 59.64
Average 91.00 50.72 79.65 76.07 70.17 64.66
Table 5: Classification accuracy of the FMNIST classifier on Deepfool black box attack images generated using substitute
model.
Classifier/ No Attack No Defense LQ-VAE Defense-GAN Madry Adv Tr
Substitute
A/B 96.34 39.53 86.01 84.70 85.41 94.13
A/C 96.34 37.59 80.10 78.11 64.72 54.22
B/A 96.60 49.21 85.67 86.19 82.55 68.11
B/C 96.60 52.52 79.98 79.91 76.31 62.53
C/A 95.02 82.87 85.90 86.29 89.79 86.75
C/B 95.02 83.26 85.20 86.17 89.91 88.40
Average 95.99 57.50 83.81 83.56 81.45 75.69
Table 6: classification accuracy of the CelebA classifier on CW black box attack images generated using substitute model
Dataset LQ-VAE Defense-GAN
MNIST 83.70 55.17
FMNIST 57.41 39.41
Table 7: Classification accuracy of end-to-end whitebox
FGSM attack on LQ-VAE - classifier combination using
BPDA.
shown to degrade in the case of black box attacks, (iv) as ar-
gued in (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018), Defense-GAN
can be attacked too by a method called the Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation (BPDA), in which case its de-
fense on MNIST is reported at 55% (Athalye, Carlini, and
Wagner 2018). When the same technique is used to attack
LQ-VAE, we get much better accuracy of 83% on the same
task which can be ascribed to the use of latent space con-
straining and quantization. In summary, we proposed a tech-
nique called LQ-VAE as a filter for the adversarial examples
using a constrained projection on to a quantized latent space
followed by data reconstruction. It serves like a ‘black-box
defense’ in the sense that it can be used to defend any at-
tack and with any classifier. In principle, LQ-VAE can be re-
trained using adversaries too, in which case the performance
is observed to improve. For instance, it is observed that if
one retrains LQ-VAE using Madry adversaries, its perfor-
mance is enhanced by 5-10% on FGSM attacks. Future di-
rections include exploration of the latent prior pθ beyond a
standard Normal distribution, studying the effect of different
types of quantization other than a simple binary quantization
and using LQ-VAE as an adversarial detector. We provide
the code3 for further research.
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Appendix
Proof for Theorem 1
Let zˆ and zˆadv be the latent encoding of x and xadv respec-
tively. Let z = H(zˆ) and zadv = H(zˆadv) be the corre-
sponding quantizations with η being the quantization thresh-
old. Then the probability of a particular bit being flipped is
given by:
p = P (z = −1, zadv = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+P (z = 1, zadv = −1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(5)
A = P (zˆ < −η,−η < zˆadv < η)
+ P (zˆ > η,−η < zˆadv < η)
= P (zˆ < −η,−η − δz < zˆ < η − δz)
+ P (zˆ > η,−η − δz < zˆ < η − δz)
=

∫ −η
−η−δz pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ if δz ≥ 0∫ η−δz
η
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ otherwise
=
∫ η+|δz|
η
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ
(6)
which is obtained by using pzˆ(zˆ) = N (0, 1) which is an
even function. Similarly,
B =
∫ η
η−|δz|
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ (7)
Adding A and B we have,
p =
∫ η+|δz|
η−|δz|
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ (8)
To give equal probability to z taking the values -1 or 1 we
have the following constraint:
P (z = 1) =
∫ η
−η
pzˆ(zˆ)dzˆ = 0.5 (9)
Solving this for pzˆ(zˆ) = N (0, 1), we have η = 0.67449.
Using this value of η and |δz| = K|δ| we get |δz| = 0.03
where K = 0.1 is the Lipschitz constant and |δ| = 0.3 is
the perturbation in the input image. Thus, the probability of
a bit being flipped is found to be p = 0.01906 which is a
significantly low number. For aM dimensional latent space,
the probability of k bit flips is
(
M
k
)
pk(1 − p)M−k which is
found to be 1.177 × 10−3 for k = 6 (≈ 10%) bit flips for a
M = 64 dimensional latent space.
Architectures of the classifier and substitute
networks
The following table shows the neural network architectures
used throughout the paper for classifier and substitute mod-
els. Terminology used:
• Conv(m, f × f, s) denotes a convolutional layer with m
filters of size f × f and stride s
• ReLu is the Rectified Linear Unit Activation
• LeakyReLu(α) is the Leaky Rectified Linear Unit Activa-
tion with parameter α
• Dropout(p) is a dropout layer with probability p
• FC(m) denotes a fully connected layer with m neuron
units
• ConvT(m, f × f, s) denotes a deconvolutional layer with
m filters of size f × fand stride s
A B C
Conv(64, 5× 5, 1) Dropout(0.2) FC(200)
ReLu Conv(64, 8× 8, 2) ReLu
Conv(64, 5× 5, 2) ReLu Dropout(0.5)
ReLu Conv(128, 6× 6, 2) FC(200)
Dropout(0.25) ReLu ReLu
FC(128) Conv(128, 5× 5, 1) FC(∗)
ReLu ReLu Softmax
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(∗) FC(∗)
Softmax Softmax
Final Fully connected layer has 10 units for MNIST and
FMNIST and 2 units for CelebA dataset.
LQ-VAE architecture
Encoder Decoder1\Decoder2
Conv(64, 3× 3, 1) FC(1024)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(64, 3× 3, 2) FC(6272)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(128, 3× 3, 2) ConvT(128,3× 3, 1)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(128, 3× 3, 1) ConvT(128,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
FC(1024) ConvT(64,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
FC(64), FC(64) ConvT(1,3× 3, 1)
Table 8: The encoder and decoder of LQ-VAE used in the
experiments on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
Encoder Decoder1\Decoder2
Conv(64, 3× 3, 1) FC(1024)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(64, 3× 3, 2) FC(4096)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(128, 3× 3, 2) ConvT(128,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(128, 3× 3, 2) ConvT(128,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
Conv(256, 3× 3, 2) ConvT(64,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
FC(1024) ConvT(64,3× 3, 2)
LeakyReLu(0.2) LeakyReLu(0.2)
FC(64), FC(64) ConvT(3,3× 3, 1)
Table 9: The encoder and decoder of LQ-VAE used in the
experiments on CelebA
